Abstract-As technology has been developed rapidly, botnet threats to the global cyber community are also increasing. And the botnet detection has recently become a major research topic in the field of network security. Most of the current detection approaches work only on the evidence from single information source, which can not hold all the traces of botnet and hardly achieve high accuracy. In this paper, a novel botnet detection architecture based on heterogeneous multi-sensor information fusion is proposed. The architecture is designed to carry out information integration in the three fusion levels of data, feature, and decision. As the core component, a feature extraction module is also elaborately designed. And an extended algorithm of the Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory is proved and adopted in decision fusion. Furthermore, a representative case is provided to illustrate that the detection architecture can effectively fuse the complicated information from various sensors, thus to achieve better detection effect.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet threats have recently transformed from highly visible, disruptive attacks to stealthy attacks used for profit, and at the center of this change are the botnets [1] . These botnets have been the workhorses of many various disastrous attacks, such as information theft [2] , distributed denial of service (DDoS) [3] , and sending spam [4] . The threats can disable the infrastructure and cause the financial damage, which leads to a severe challenge for the global network security. Hence, in order to detect botnet attacks effectively, we need to have a correct and comprehensive understanding of the botnet attacks. In particular, we must fuse all the gathered information related to botnet activities from heterogeneous multi-source sensors, and then carry out further analysis for decision-making. Therefore, we can say that information fusion is absolutely a necessary component for botnet detection [5] .
Botnet is a network composed by computers on which the software called 'bot' is automatically installed without user intervention, and is remotely controlled via command and control channel for malicious purpose [6] . Its activities have the following common characteristics. First, they have more action phases and representation forms than the traditional malware attacks. The activity cycle of a botnet attack usually consists of four stages, i.e., propagation, infection, communication, and attack [7] . Even in the same stage, different botnet attacks could exhibit various activity forms, such as propagating by system vulnerabilities or email. Second, the botnet activities are wide-ranging from a private host, local area network to the backbone [8] . Third, the botnet activities are always hidden. Since their resulting network traffic is small, the bots can upgrade itself without exposition for a long time [9] . These three characteristics make great difficulty in botnet detection. However, it is well known that the traces of botnet would be recorded during its actions over a wide range [10] . There are diverse types of information sources which can be retrieved, such as network packets, network flows, system logs, alerts from anti-virus software or intrusion detection systems, and the analysis results from botnet detection tools. Though the information could be used to identify the traces of botnet, it is usually large-scale, uncertain and redundant.
Despite of the importance of information fusion for botnet detection, most of the existing work does not focus on this field. To our best knowledge, the existing botnet detection schemes can discover bots to some extent, but they do not make full use of the multifarious information related to botnet activities and are not able to handle the entire situation of botnet infiltration. In recent years, multi-sensor information fusion has been rapidly developed and applied in many sophisticated application areas, especially network security [11] . In the view of integrating the complicated information from heterogeneity and multi-source in an efficient way, we propose a botnet detection architecture based on information fusion techniques. In the architecture, we design a novel feature extraction module and adopt an extended decision fusion algorithm, which enables the detection to achieve three-level fusions of data, feature and decision.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses background technologies and related work. Section 3 presents the botnet detection architecture based on heterogeneous multi-sensor information fusion. Section 4 introduces a fusion algorithm used in the architecture and gives the proof of the algorithm. Section 5 shows an illustration of botnet detection. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Botnet is a new type of attack which is developed and syncretized from network worm, Trojan, backdoor tools and other traditional forms of malicious code [12] . However, compared to these traditional attacks, the major difference is that the botnet has a one-to-many control relationship among attackers and bots [13] . This feature makes botnet more privacy, flexible and efficient than any other malicious programs.
With the evolution of botnet, the detection techniques for it have also developed. Many diverse schemes for botnet detection have been proposed, such as honeypot or honeynet for capture and analysis [14] , correlation analysis of malicious behaviors [15] , detection approaches for different C&C mechanisms (e.g. IRC, HTTP, DNS, or P2P) [16] [17] [18] [19] , and identifying bots from DDoS and spam [20, 21] . However, these techniques mainly focus on the network traffic and obtain evidences of botnet activities indirectly. For example, the evidence for detecting the upgrade of bot is obtained by identifying the upgrade binaries in the traffic, rather than directly derived from the code server which logs the download event. Single information source and indirect evidences cause the following three problems for botnet detection. First, it usually brings the false-positive and false-negative. Second, it will extend the detection cycle. Generally, multiple rounds observations are required to give the correct results. Third, due to the inadequate information collection, it is very difficult to be aware of new botnet or botnet variations. Therefore, the research on detection architecture with the ability of integrating heterogeneous multi-sensor information should be paid more attention.
Robert et al. [22] design a multi-layered architecture for the detection of a wide range of existing and new botnets. The architecture can integrate many techniques to detect the gather information from all the available network information sources: network traffic data, system process information, and file system information. Napoleon et al. [23] introduce a risk-aware networkcentric management framework to detect and prevent targeted botnet attacks as well as propagation attempts with the network. The framework systematically collects network traffic and vulnerabilities in software, comprehensively analysis and discovers characteristics and unique behaviors of bots, and dynamically determines associated risks and generates corresponding detection rules. Zhang et al. [24] develop a top-down analytical framework as a basis for critical evaluation on the existing countermeasures. The framework correlates and integrates the observations and reports of anti-botnet tools at different layers, i.e., Internet, intranet, and host, for achieving a whole snapshot of the botnet. Alireza et al. [25] propose an architecture which is called "Visual Threat Monitor" that combines data mining and visualization to enhance botnet traffic detection. The processing pipeline of the architecture consists of correlation, statistical analysis, clustering, aggregation, and visualization. On the basis of the studies [15, 26, 27] , Gu et al. [28] present a general detection framework to realize more accurate botnet detection over local area network. It analyzes of traffic and network flow, correlating with multiple alerts or events of intrusion detection system. The aforementioned detection architectures have some problems in the aspect of information fusion. First, the types of the information source are incomplete. And there is no proper division method towards the information source according to the botnet activities, which would cause large redundancy information and ill-targeted collection. Second, the aforementioned schemes are lack of a powerful algorithm to fuse large-scale information from different sources and obtain the correlation between attackers and their botnets, though they adopt some correlation analysis methods. Third, most of the existing frameworks do not have independent feature extraction module, or function of feature extraction is too simple.
III. ARCHITECTURE OVERVIEW
Information fusion technique is a kind of information processing method makes use of information from multiple sensors, and related information from associated database, achieves improved accuracies and more specific inferences than could be achieved by the use of a single sensor alone [29] . Network security is the latest application of information fusion, and all these applications are mainly about the improvement of IDS [30] . Information fusion processes are often categorized as data, feature or decision level fusion depending on the processing stage at which fusion takes place [31] . Data level fusion, combines several sources of raw information to produce new information that is expected to be more informative and synthetic than the inputs. Feature level fusion, various features are combined into a feature map that may be used by further process. Decision level fusion, combines decisions coming from several expert knowledge. According to the processes of information fusion, we give the botnet detection architecture based on heterogeneous multi-sensor information fusion in this paper, which consists of several parts in Figure 1 .
A. Information Collection
This part adopts a role-based collaborative information collection model, which is our recent work in [32] . This part includes the software and hardware of the information collection system, the main task is to collect all the information related to botnet activities from heterogeneous multi-source sensors. The information can be gathered from computers in the network, network security equipments such as firewall, intrusion detection system (IDS), and network equipments such as router and switch. The function of this part is implemented by the information collection agent.
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B. Pre-processing
To increase the effect and efficiency of further information fusion, Pre-processing is needed. Preprocessing module is composed of classification and refinement. Classification is to divide the information source into original information, indirect information and direct information. The original information includes the real record of network and system behaviors without any security analysis, such as packet payload, system process information, etc. However, the indirect information is the alarm information from general security software, such as anti-virus software, firewall, honeypot, etc. The indirect information, always combined with original information, could be the indirect evidences for botnet detection. Besides, direct information is the analysis result of technical botnet detection tools (e.g. BotHunter [15] ), which could be the direct evidence for botnet detection. Refinement is to filter out unwanted information, detect the suspicious information on preset rules, unify the presentation, and store the result into the information database.
C. Feature Extraction
Feature extraction is the core module of the architecture. The existing detection techniques use the following two extraction modes:
• Utilizing the botnet samples captured by honeypot or honeynet (including bots, message contents, etc.). Because the sample data is relatively pure, extracted data features can be directly adopted as the essential features (signature or pattern) of botnet.
• Utilizing general information (such as flow data, logs, etc.) and indirect information. The main process is: first of all, try to discover data features; then, compare to the results found by the proved botnet detection system; finally, verify whether the data features of information belong to the essential features of botnets.
Our feature extraction covers the above-mentioned two modes. As shown in figure 2 , the structure of feature extraction module consists of four parts, including attribute selection, data feature analysis, validation and scheme management. The data feature analysis integrates data mining methods, such as statistical data analysis, pattern recognition, artificial neural networks, support vector machines, etc. Its goal is to provide a mechanism for the identification of new features in the data sets from the attribute selection. For general and indirect information, it must be verified before being stored into the feature database as signatures or patterns. Meanwhile, through the extracted features, the scheme management gives feedbacks to the modules of the data feature analysis and the attribute selection for dynamic optimization. Besides, this part divides the analytic results into four main categories as the inputs of the fusion analysis, i.e., propagation, infection, communication and attack, according to the stages of botnet activities.
D. Fusion Analysis
Fusion Analysis is also the key of the architecture and the main module of producing high-level and qualified alerts. This part gives the final conclusion for the decision-making to reflect the real situation of the botnet activities. The detailed process will be described in section 4.
E. Database
The information database stores the results producing by pre-processing module. The results have been divided into three categories, which is useful for the following fusions. The feature database stores signatures and patterns from the feature extraction. And the knowledge database includes vulnerability database, security policy, client configuration records, etc., which can provide a strong data support for the decision-making.
F. Control and Collaboration Mechanism
Control mechanism is used to react against the offending events taking place on or within the detection system. Depending on the result of analysis and synthesis, this part adopts the measure responding to the main modules. And some responding work can be finished automatically by control mechanism through adjusting system parameters. Collaboration mechanism provides the communications and function calls among the detection systems or with other security products.
IV. METHOD OF FUSION ANALYSIS
Decision fusion algorithms in the fusion analysis confront three critical requirements as follows:
• Flexibility. The algorithm should require no prior probability and conditional probability. Since the botnet behaviors are often random and uncertain, it is difficult to obtain the prior knowledge.
• Compatibility. It can effectively integrate heterogeneous multi-sensor information, and in particular with the accumulation of evidences, the decision will be more accurate.
• Scalability. It has the ability to easily fuse new evidences from the emerging sensors without changing the framework of algorithm. The Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory is the right one that can meet these requirements among the main algorithms. The D-S theory is a mathematical theory of evidence, introduced in the 1960's by Arthur Dempster [33] and developed in the 1970's by Glenn Shafer [34] . It is viewed as a mechanism for reasoning under epistemic (knowledge) uncertainty. First, we will give a brief introduction of D-S theory [35] . Then, in our architecture we will introduce an extended D-S theory proposed in [36] to fuse the results from feature extraction. And we will give a proof of the extended theory which was not proved in [36] .
D-S Theory
Frame of discernment (Θ) is a finite set mutually exclusive propositions and hypotheses about some problem domain. Basic probability assignment (bpa) is stated in [34] as: "If Θ is a frame of discernment, then a function m: is called a basic probability assignment whenever
The mass value of A (m(A)) is also called A's basic probability number, and it is understood to be the measure of the belief that is committed exactly to A."
Plausibility function (Pl) takes into account all the elements related to A (either supported by evidence or unknown). 
Dempster's rule of combination can be used to combine the mass values of all features from each individual sensor to achieve the overall summary mass values for each sensor. These summary values from all sensors are combined to give the summary mass values for the system. Initially, the bpas are used to assign the mass values to appropriate hypothesis. Then the resulting mass values are used to calculate the belief for the appropriate hypothesis. Finally all beliefs are combined with Dempster's rule of combination to gain the overview belief for the appropriate hypothesis, as shown in (5).
Extended D-S Theory
Dempster's rule of combination gives equivalent trust to the evidences provided by different sensors as shown in (5) . But actually it is not the case. Observations show that for the same type of sensors, the local ones should provide more credible information than the remote ones; even if the same sensor, installed in different locations of network will have different detection capacity; different types of sensors, may have different detection capability and accuracy for the same type of attack, so that the provided evidences will have great difference in importance and reliability. To solve these problems, the extended D-S theory assigns different weight to different Figure. 3 Illustration of botnet detection. sensors. It means that different sensors are given different trusts. As shown in (6), using a weighted index method, the evidences after the rule combination should meet the basic nature of the bpa, that is to say, (2).
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In the extended D-S theory, the weights can be obtained by training samples based on maximum entropy or minimum mean square error, and also can be the experience values from several tests.
Weight Assignment
In addition to the situations of sensors, our researches show that weight assignment should take the stages of botnet activities into account. The features which are extracted from the stages of communication and attack are more credible than those from the stages of propagation and infection. Moreover, other factors, such as vulnerability, might also affect the weight assignment.
V. SCENARIO
As shown in Figure 3 , this is a typical environment for botnet attacks. The environment contains the local area network and backbone network, involving three application servers (EMAIL, WWW, and DNS), one management server, three firewalls, an attacker, a honeynet, several zombies, etc. The Attacker sends the commands to the zombies through command and control channel. According to the commands, the bots on the zombies will carry out some actions such as propagation, information theft, DDoS attack, spam, etc. The thin oneway arrow in figure 3 shows the process of command and control communication. Towards this typical environment, BotHunters are deployed for two local area networks; Spam filters is used in EMAIL server; Servers and hosts are equipped with terminal monitor and log analysis tools; network traffic monitor for flow and traffic information; vulnerability scanning systems to collect vulnerability, configuration, and port information for servers and hosts. All the sensors through the collection agents send the information to the management server for fusion analysis. Then the management server gives the final results to the administrator. The thick one-way arrow shows the aforementioned process.
To show the work of the botnet detection architecture, an example of sending spam is provided in figure 3 . It can be observed that the attacker discovers the zombies online and commands the bots on the zombies to send spam to victim host A and B. On the one hand, the BotHunters can detect the bots in the network by monitoring the traffic. On the other hand, other sensors can also hold every stage of spam botnet activities. The log analysis tools in DNS server could discover some suspicious hosts, for the spam bots usually perform DNSBL lookups on the DNS server to determine whether they are blacklisted [37] . The terminal and traffic monitors could retrieve the direct evidences of anomalies from the communications. In a word, all the sensors send the suspicious information to the management server. Then, the management server carries out pre-processing, feature extraction and fusion analysis to integrate and analyze the received information, so that the administrator can fully master the evidences of the interactions between the attacker and the zombies within a short time. And, this fusion process can also identify the zombies [38] as well as the position of the attacker [39] . If the administrator only monitored the traffic or only checked email records to identify the spam activities, it may take more time and cause more false-positive alarms. Theoretically speaking, the results from fusion analysis are more accurate than those from the BotHunters.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have introduced a botnet detection architecture based on heterogeneous multi-sensor information fusion. Also, we described functionalities and features of each component in the architecture, highlighting the module of feature extraction. In addition, we introduced an extended algorithm of D-S theory and gave its proof. Finally, we elaborated a representative case of detecting spam botnet to demonstrate the feasibility of our architecture.
For the future work, we are going to implement the prototype and deploy it in the real network, and then evaluate the accuracy of the fusion algorithm to compare the existing detection method. Our ultimate goal is to develop a practical botnet detection system, following the architecture proposed in this paper, to integrate multiple information fusion techniques, and eventually provide identification, evaluation and prediction for the botnet.
